Professor Daehoon Noh of Korea University Business School received the SK Award for his research on the impact of competition between ride-sharing platforms and autonomous robotaxis on the market and social welfare. 

I am sincerely grateful that this research has been published in Management Science and has received the SK Paper Award from Korea University Business School. This paper analyzes the impact of competition between two distinct business models—ride-sharing platforms and autonomous robotaxis—on the market and social welfare. 

I would like to express my gratitude to my co-authors and fellow researchers who contributed to this work, as well as to the university for providing a supportive research environment. Moving forward, I will continue to pursue my research with dedication while exploring, from an objective perspective, the changes in the industrial ecosystem brought about by technological innovation. Thank you.

• Title of Paper :  Evolution of Ride Services: From Ride Hailing to Autonomous Vehicles 

• Journal : Management Science

• Publication Date : January 26, 2026

• Summary of Key Findings : 

This paper analyzes the competition between platform-based ride-hailing (RH) firms and vertically integrated autonomous vehicle (AV) robotaxi firms.

The key difference between the two models lies in the vehicle supply model. AV firms must invest in and own vehicles upfront, thereby fixing capacity through significant capital investment. In contrast, RH firms can flexibly adjust vehicle supply without incurring sunk costs by adjusting the revenue-sharing rate with drivers.

The study finds that RH firms have a strong strategic advantage due to the flexibility of their platform-based business model. The main findings are as follows :

First, when customers are less sensitive to waiting time, RH firms dominate the market even if they face a cost disadvantage. By credibly threatening price reductions, RH firms deter excessive investment by AV firms, ultimately achieving shorter waiting times, higher market share, and higher profits.

Second, when a new AV firm enters an existing RH monopoly market, a paradoxical outcome may occur: despite increased competition, total vehicle supply decreases and customer waiting times increase.

Third, when an inefficient AV firm enters a market where customers are highly sensitive to waiting time, incumbent RH firms strategically reduce vehicle supply to avoid intense competition. As a result, customer waiting costs increase, leading to a decline in overall social welfare.

In conclusion, this study demonstrates that a decentralized platform model without asset ownership has an advantage over a capital-intensive AV model. It therefore suggests that regulators should be cautious about indiscriminately subsidizing or facilitating the entry of inefficient robotaxi services solely because they are based on new technology.