‘장하성 펀드’-작지만 혁신적인 실험

  장하성 고려대학교 경영대학 학장의 글이 세계 최고 권위의 경제지인 파이낸셜 타임스(FT)에 실렸다.

  장 학장은 ‘한국으로의 투자’라는 주제의 FT의 별지 특집면 (12월 4일자)에 ‘a long way to go’라는 제목으로 특별 기고를 했다.

  장 학장은 이 글에서  최근 한국에서 활동을 시작한 ‘한국 기업지배 구조펀드 (일명 장하성 펀드)’를 소개하면서 ‘한국은 이 펀드로 인해 작지만 혁신적인 실험을 목격했다’라고 소개했다.

 조선일보 동아일보 한국경제신문 이 데일리 등은 장하성학장의 FT기고문을 한국어로 번역래 보도했다,

*기사 원문

>>Corporate governance: a long way to go

 (By Jang Hasung)

Published: November 30 2006 18:51 | Last updated: November 30 2006 18:51

In recent months, South Korea’s stock market has been witnessing a small but innovative experiment. The Korea Corporate Governance Fund, which was established last April, has since August disclosed a part of its shareholdings, in order to meet regulations. Korean regulation requires shareholdings of 5 per cent or more of any listed company to be disclosed.

In its disclosure, the fund claimed that it would enhance corporate value by improving the corporate governance of the companies in which it invests. Initial market response to the disclosure has been phenomenal. Share prices of disclosed stocks surged to their upper price limit for several consecutive days, and rose nearly 50 per cent in the three days after the disclosures were made.

It is yet to be seen whether such drastic increases in share prices will end as a storm in a teacup or will give birth to a new long-term value investment model in Korea. Many observers agree that Korea Inc is severely undervalued relative to its earnings, or at least relative to its net asset value.

However, if you believe the market is efficient, such undervaluation is not without reason. One of the key risk factors that is not reflected in traditional textbook valuations is corporate governance. Whether the fund has a capacity and means to identify and fix corporate governance problems is still to be proven. Nevertheless, the stock market is showing a great deal of expectation that such a strategy will enhance share values.

In 1997, a financial crisis swept across Korea and the rest of East Asia. The immediate cause was the flight of foreign capital from the region in the wake of sudden depreciation of currencies and increased volatility on the foreign exchanges. But that was only the igniting factor. Economists and policy makers alike had to look for more fundamental and structural weakness in economies that were common to all the countries that suffered from the crisis. One of these factors that they identified was poor corporate governance.

Korea’s successful economic growth for 30 years from the late 1960s was driven by government initiatives rather than market forces. In 1994, Korea had officially ended its government-led planned economy by abandoning the five-year economic development plan that had played a key role in its economic success. It recognised that protectionist policies and government intervention would no longer ensure sustainable long-term growth in a globalised economy. The country opened its markets by joining the World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and it was the beginning of new market economy in Korea.

However, the government and the chaebol (conglomerates) failed to reform the country’s economic and business structures. In particular, the chaebol failed to adopt a governance structure that would be compatible with the new, open, market economy.

The result was a series of corporate scandals involving accounting fraud, failed audits, unfair transactions with affiliated companies and even outright theft of corporate cash and assets. Expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling families and management destroyed investors’ confidenceand share value. At least in the Korean capital market, corporate governance became a bigger risk factor even than North Korea.

Since the financial crisis, Korea has improved its corporate governance a great deal. New rules and regulations have been introduced and a new consolidated market supervisory agency has been established. Corporate governance reforms have been particularly noticeable for improving accounting standards and practices, providing timely corporate disclosures and strengthening minority shareholders’ rights. Shareholders will also be able to launch class action lawsuits from next year.

There have been drastic changes in the boardroom, too. For example, in 1997, Samsung Electronics did not have a single independent director, even though the board was unmanageably large with 59 members. Now, it has only 13 directors and outside directors form a majority.

In spite of significant improvements, however, Korea Inc still has a long way to go to overcome the so-called “Korea discount” that is believed to be rooted in poor corporate governance practices. Weak enforcement of rules and regulation is one of the key areas that needs to be improved. Market regulators often forget their role as enforcers of rules and regulations. They have not totally abandoned their old habit of being interventionist market players.

Prosecutors, too, do not enjoy a reputation for being independent from political and business influences. Fortunately, judges are independent and uncorrupt, but they are not properly trained to understand dynamic market practices.

The chaebol system is the area where another major corporate governance reform is necessary. The chaebol has been an effective model in developing Korean industries when there was no developed capital market, and when competition in domestic market was limited to local companies. However, reform is needed to make these groups fit for the new, open market economy with its developed capital market.

On average, controlling families of the top 10 chaebol groups own less than 5 per cent of the outstanding shares. But they maintain uncontested control of tens of affiliated companies, of which they do not own a single share.

This creates moral hazard for the controlling families. They do not respect share value and sometimes even destroy it. Related party transactions are conducted unfairly for the private benefit of the controlling family, at the expense of minority shareholders. A large amount of capital is wasted in holdings of affiliated companies. The majority of such equity holdings is for securing the controlling power of families and lacks any business rationale.

Passive shareholding is another reason why poor corporate governance practice is persistent. Retail investors tend to be short-term traders. Institutions are taking passive positions and often do not fulfil their fiduciary duty to investors. Some local and foreign institutional investors are not independent from the influence of the chaebol, due to conflicts with potential investment banking business. Sometimes, xenophobic sentiment from the public prevents foreign investors from taking an active role.

According to Bernard Black and co-authors in their article this year in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, a worst-to-best change in the Korea corporate governance index would produce a 47 per cent increase in Tobin’s q (the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of its assets). That is equivalent to a 160 per cent increase in share prices.

The Korea discount may not be entirely attributed to poor corporate governance. At the same time, no one would deny that better corporate governance will bring more corporate value and contribute to encouraging long-term stable investments.

In corporate governance reforms, the good news is that Korea Inc passed the point of no return a long time ago. The reforms cannot be reversed, nor can they be derailed by opposition from the establishment or the chaebol, blind patriotism or any political ideology. But there is a high risk that progress could be slowed or even halted – any of these negative forces can slow or even stop the progress. Korea needs renewed corporate governance reforms to reinvigorate its economic growth.

Jang Hasung is dean and professor of finance, Korea University Business School

*한국언론의 관련보도

-조선일보

장하성 교수 "기업지배구조 개선 갈 길 멀다"

장하성(53) 고려대 교수는 4일 파이낸셜 타임스(FT) 칼럼에서 “한국의 기업들이 빈약한 기업 지배구조에 따른 ’코리아 디스카운트’를 극복하려면 아직 갈 길이 멀다”고 지적했다.

장 교수는 이날 ’한국으로의 투자’ 주제의 FT의 별지 특집면에 실린 칼럼을 통해서 “최근 몇달간 한국 투자자들은 작지만 혁신적인 실험을 목격했다”며 한국기업지배구조펀드의 활동과 이에 따른 관련 종목의 주가 급등을 소개했다.

그는 “이같은 주가 급등이 찻잔 속의 태풍에 그칠 지 아니면 새로운 한국의 장기 가치투자 모델을 제시할 지 판단하는 것은 아직 이르다”고 말했다.

그는 “금융위기 이후 기업지배구조가 크게 개선됐으나 여전히 갈 길이 멀다”며 “특히 법과 규제가 엄격하게 시행되지 않는 점은 개선돼야 할 부분 중 하나”라고 말했다.

장 교수는 “시장 감시기관들은 종종 법과 규제를 집행해야할 본연의 역할을 잊는 경향이 있고 검찰도 정치와 기업의 영향력으로부터 독립적이라는 명성을 누리지 못하고 있다”며 “다행히 법원은 독립적이지만 역동적인 시장의 실무를 이해할 만큼 훈련받지 못했다”고 꼬집었다.

장 교수는 이어 “한국 기업들이 지금까지 개선된 것을 되돌리지는 않겠지만 진척 속도가 늦춰지거나 아예 정지될 위험성이 매우 높다”며 “경제 성장에 활력을 되찾기 위해서 기업지배구조 개선을 다시 시작해야한다”고 말했다.

2006. 12. 04.

-이데일리 

'장하성 펀드, 작지만 혁신적인 실험'-FT 

새로운 장기투자 모델 판단은 아직 일러

재벌, 추가 개혁 이뤄져야 

‘한국 증시는 최근 몇 달간 작지만 매우 혁신적인 실험을 목도하고 있다. 그 충격이 찻잔속의 폭풍으로 끝날지 한국에서 새로운 장기 가치투자 모델이 될 지는 아직 판단하기 이르다’

파이낸셜타임스(FT)는 4일 ‘한국 투자’ 특집 기사에서 한국기업지배구조펀드(일명 장하성펀드)가 증시에 또 다른 변화의 바람을 불어넣고 있다고 보도했다. 이와 함께 한국의 기업지배구조는 IMF위기 이후 많이 개선됐지만 여전히 갈 길이 멀다고 평가했다.

지난 4월 설립된 장하성 펀드는 투자기업의 지배구조를 개선해 기업가치를 높이겠다고 선언했다. 이후 펀드가 5% 이상 지분 보유를 공시하는 기업들의 주가가 연일 천정부지로 치솟았다.

FT는 장하성펀드를 '작지만 혁신적인 실험'이라고 평가했다. 다만 펀드가 한국 증시 전반에 새로운 장기투자 풍토를 정착시킬지 여부는 아직 판단하기 이르다고 평가했다.

이와 함께 '코리아 디스카운트'의 뿌리인 한국 기업지배구조 문제는 많이 개선됐지만 여전히 개혁해야 할 부분들이 많다고 지적했다.

특히 부실한 규제 수행을 개선돼야 할 핵심 분야로 꼽았다. 시장 감독기관들이 규정 강화 본분을 종종 잊는데다, 검찰 역시 정치 및 기업 영향력에서 벗어나 독립적인 감독자로서의 역할을 다 하지 못하고 있다는 것.

또한 재벌구조 또한 더 개혁되야 한다고 평가했다. 아울러 개인투자자들이 단기투자 성향이 강해, 기업 경영 등에 소극적이기 때문에 재벌구조가 더 굳어지고 있다고 비판했다.

FT는 한국의 기업지배구조가 돌이킬 수 없이 확실한 개혁 일로를 걷고 있다고 긍정적으로 평가했다. 그러나 개혁 속도가 둔화되거나 중단될 위험은 여전히 남아있다며, 개혁 노력을 재고해 경제성장에 다시 활기를 불어넣어야 한다고 주장했다. 

2006. 12. 4.

 *칼럼 링크 주소 .

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/432108f6-8099-11db-9096-0000779e2340,_i_email=y.html